1060-1069; 4-6-2

Discussion in 'Steam Locomotive Diagrams' started by Karl, Nov 19, 2010.

  1. Karl

    Karl 2008 Engineer of the Year Frisco.org Supporter

    The 1060 class 4-6-2's were sisters to the spot classes. Their tenders shared the same dimensions, as did many of the other features, e.g., cab, domes, firebox, etc. The Jacobs-Shubert firebox was troublesome, and the Frisco rebuilt them with radial stay fire boxes. The 9/17/1918 revision date on the diagram suggests that this change may have come very early to these locomotives. Does anyone have a better date? As of the date of this diagram, these locomotives still carried the train indicators.

    The Frisco West Shops rebuilt these locomotives into 4-6-4's during 1937-1941.

    Locomotives listed below lasted until the "end".
    1060
    1062
    1063
    1064
    1065
    1066
    1068
     

    Attached Files:

  2. meteor910

    meteor910 2009 Engineer of the Year Staff Member Frisco.org Supporter

    To add to Karl's posting of the diagram of the SLSF 1060-1069 class 4-6-2 Pacifics, attached is the diagram for these locomotives as rebuilt by the Frisco into 4-6-4 Hudsons.

    Most every railroad's 4-6-4 Hudsons looked very good. These Frisco rebuilds looked good as any to my eye.

    A question for Don and the other Frisco steam mavens out there - how good of a locomotive were the Frisco 4-6-4 rebuilds?

    Ken
     

    Attached Files:

  3. TAG1014

    TAG1014 Frisco.org Supporter Frisco.org Supporter

    Thanks Ken--Neat to see which engines were rebuilt in which years.

    Tom
     
  4. Karl

    Karl 2008 Engineer of the Year Frisco.org Supporter

    Here'e an article from the Springfield paper.

    http://www.frisco.org/vb/showthread.php?t=514&highlight=1062

    Several years ago, I spoke with Al(?) Weaver, who is one of the caretakers of the 4524, and who was a Frisco engineer. He said that 4310 and 1060 were his favorites; they'd run as fast as you had guts.
     
    Last edited by a moderator: Nov 20, 2010
  5. meteor910

    meteor910 2009 Engineer of the Year Staff Member Frisco.org Supporter

    Another question for the frisco.org steam mavens out there ..........

    Yesterday I posted a Frisco steam locomotive diagram (see posting of 11/19 above) for the SLSF 1060-1069 class 4-6-4 Hudson rebuilds. This diagram was last revised on March 1, 1947.

    Attached is another, but later, diagram for the same class of Frisco 4-6-4's, revised as of August 4, 1949. SLSF 1069, rebuilt from a 4-6-2 in 1937, is missing. Only SLSF 1060-1068 are noted.

    What happened to 1069 ?????

    Somewhere in the back of my mind, I'm thinking I have heard of 1069's fate, but it is lost somewhere back there. I checked a bunch of my books and records tonight, but cannot find the explanation.

    Anybody have the answer? Yet another Frisco mystery! I'm sure one or more of you can explain this.

    Ken
     

    Attached Files:

  6. Karl

    Karl 2008 Engineer of the Year Frisco.org Supporter

    In short Diesels...

    1069 was retired circa 1947-1948;1061 and 1067 were off the roster by 1951. The rest of the class remained through 1951
     
  7. meteor910

    meteor910 2009 Engineer of the Year Staff Member Frisco.org Supporter

    Thanks Karl. Makes sense - I'm glad to hear it wasn't wrecked somewhere.

    Ken
     
  8. frisco1522

    frisco1522 Staff Member Staff Member

    I'm sure I've posted this before, but here's the 1067 turned over at Holland, MO in 1950.
     

    Attached Files:

  9. Karl

    Karl 2008 Engineer of the Year Frisco.org Supporter

    Malicious Tampering

    3341​



    INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION​



    WASHINGTON​



    REPORT NO. 3341​



    ST. LOUIS-SAN FRANCISCO RAILWAY COMPANY IN RE ACCIDENT AT HOLLAND MO., ON JULY 23, 1950​



    Report No. 3341​



    SUMMARY​


    Date: July 23, 1950

    Railroad: St. Louis-San Francisco

    Location: Holland, Mo.

    Kind of accident: Derailment

    Train involved: Passenger

    Train number: 806

    Engine number: 1067

    Consist: 7 cars

    Speed: 57 m. p. h.

    Operation: Timetable and train orders

    Track: Single; tangent; level

    Weather: Cloudy

    Time: 1:09 a.m.

    Casual ties: 1 killed; 22 injured

    Cause: Malicious tempering with switch


    REPORT NO. 3341​



    IN THE MATTER OF MAKING ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORTS UNDER THE ACCIDENT REPORTS ACT OF MAY 6, 1910.​



    ST. LOUIS-SAN FRANCISCO RAILWAY COMPANY​



    August 31, 1950​


    Accident at Holland, Mo., on July 23, 1950, caused by malicious tampering with a switch.

    REPORT OF THE COMMISSION 1

    PATTERSON, Commissioner:

    On July 23, 1950, there was a derailment of a passenger train on the St. Louis-San Francisco Railway at Holland, Mo., which resulted in the death of 1 train-service employee, and the injury of 18 passengers, 1 mail clerk, 1 steward, and 2 train-service employees.

    Diagram

    Report No. 3341 St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Holland, Mo. July 23, 1950

    Location of Accident and Method of Operation

    This accident occurred on that part of the River Division extending between Turrell Ark., and Chaffee, Mo., 139.5 miles. In the vicinity of the point of accident this is a single-track line over which trains are operated by timetable and train orders. There is no block system in use. At Holland, 55.8 miles north of Turrell, a aiding 4,007 feet in length parallels the main track on the east. The switches of this siding are, respectively, 3,624 feet south and 583 feet north of the station. The accident occurred on the turnout at the south end of the siding. From the south there is a 2 degrees 52' curve to the right 785 feet in length, and then a tangent 3,871.9 feet to the south siding-switch. The grade is level.

    In the vicinity of the point of accident the track is laid on a fill about 3 feet in height. The structure of the main track consists of 90-pound rail, 33 feet in length, rolled in 1924 and laid in the track the same year on an average of 20 treated ties to the rail length. It is fully tieplated with single-shoulder tieplates, single-spiked, and is provided with 4-hole 24-inch head-free toeless joint bars, and an average of 7 rail anchors per rail. It is ballasted with chats to a depth of 6 inches on a sub-ballast of 4 inches of crushed rock. The south turnout of the siding is constructed of 90-pound rail, and is provided with a No. 10 spring-rail type frog and 15-foot switch rails. The turnout is not superelevated, The derailment occurred 91.1 feet north of the point of switch. The switch stand is of the hand-throw intermediate-stand type and is spiked to one tie at a distance of 9 feet east of the center-line of the track. It is equipped with an oil-burning lamp and one target. The lamp has two green and two red lenses, 5 inches in diameter. When the switch is lined for movement on the main track, a green light is displayed in the direction of approaching trains. When the switch is lined for entry to the siding, a red light and a red circular target, 16 inches in diameter, are displayed. The centers of the lenses and the center of the target are, respectively, 6 feet 7 inches and 5 feet 5 inches above the level of the tops of the rails. The operating lever is of the horizontal throw type and is hinged so that it will drop into either of two slots cut in the rim of the switch-stand table. These slots are placed to correspond with full-throw positions of the switch. A U-shaped keeper of round metal stock, 1/4 inch in diameter, is riveted to the lever above the fulcrum. When the lever is dropped into position in either of the slots, the keeper projects through an opening provided in the table of the stand. The switch is locked in position by inserting the shackle of a switch lock through this keeper. The switch lock had a shackle 3/8 inch in diameter and was secured to the switch stand by a chain.

    The maximum authorized speed for the train involved in this accident was 70 miles per hour.

    Description of Accident

    No. 806, a north-bound first-class passenger train, consisted of engine 1067, a 4-6-4 type, two baggage cars, one mail car, two coaches, one buffet-lounge car, and one sleeping car, in the order named. All cars were of all-steel construction except the first car, which was of steel-underframe construction. This train departed from Blytheville, the last open office, 9.8 miles south of Holland, at 12:55 a.m., 8 minutes late, and while moving at a speed of 57 miles per hour it entered the south turnout of the siding at Holland, and the engine, the tender, and the first five cars were derailed.

    The engine and the tender were derailed to the right end stopped with the engine on its right side, practically in line with the track and 15 feet east of the center-line of the siding. The front end was 454 feet north of the point of derailment and 544 feet north of the point of switch of the turnout. The tender remained coupled to the engine and stopped upside down and in line with the engine. Separations occurred at both ends of the first two cars. The first car stopped upside down, across both tracks and at right angles to them. The second car stopped on its left side, across both tracks and approximately parallel to the first car. The third car stopped upright, east of the siding, with its north end adjacent to the south and of the second car. The fourth car stopped upright, with its north end east of the siding and its south end on the track structure. The north truck of the fifth car was derailed. The engine and the tender were badly damaged, the first car was demolished, the second car was badly damaged and the other derailed cars were slightly damaged.

    The engineer was killed. The conductor and the fireman were injured.

    The weather was cloudy at the time of the accident, which occurred at 1:09 a.m.

    During the 30-day period preceding the day of the accident, the average daily movement over this line was *** trains.

    Discussion

    As No. 806 was approaching Holland, it was moving on tangent track at a speed of 57 miles per hour in territory where the maximum authored speed was 70 miles per hour. The enginemen were in the cab of the engine, the conductor was in the sixth car, the flagman was in the rear car, and the porter was in the fourth car. Before the accident occurred the engine and the cars were riding smoothly. The brakes had been tested and had functioned properly when used en route.

    Examination of the equipment of No. 806 after the accident occurred disclosed no defective condition which could have contributed to the cause of the accident. Examination of the main track throughout a considerable distance immediately south of the point of accident disclosed no indication of dragging equipment nor of any obstruction having been on the track. The first mark on the track structure was a cut on the gage side of the head of the west rail of the siding, starting at a point 90.6 feet north of the point of switch and extending northward about 15 inches. The first mark of derailment was a flange mark on a spike head outside the west rail of the siding, 91.1 feet north of the point of' switch. Flange marks then appeared on the next northward tie 6 inches west of the west rail. These marks and corresponding marks west of the east rail extended northward on the ties, intermittently and at varying distances from the rails, throughout a distance of 122 feet. Then they veered sharply to the east. From this point northward the track was destroyed a distance of about 350 feet. The switch of the, south turnout of the siding was found to be lined for entry to the siding. The operating lever was seated in the slot corresponding to that position, and the switch point fitted properly against the stock rail. A piece of metal about 3/4 inch in length had been sawed from the center of the shackle of the switch lock, and the south and west lenses of the switch lamp had been broken. The lamp was not lighted, and the target was bent in such manner that it indicated that the switch was lined for movement on the main track.

    The engineer was killed and the fireman was too severely injured to be questioned in this investigation. Therefore, it could riot be determined when they first became aware that the switch was not properly lined. Examination of the engine controls after the accident occurred disclosed that the sander valve, the reverse lever, and the independent brake valve were so badly damaged that their positions prior to the accident could not be determined. The automatic brake-valve handle was in emergency position. The throttle was about one-third open but its position could have been changed as a result of the derailment. Each train-service employee questioned in this investigation said he did not know whether the brakes were applied before the derailment occurred. However, sand was found on the tops and sides of the rails a distance of about 300 feet south of the switch point. This condition indicates the probability that the brakes were applied before the engine entered the, turnout.

    The switch was last examined by the section foreman on July 21, at which time he replaced two of the switch-lamp lenses which were broken, and he straightened the target, which had been bent. When he left the switch it was properly lined and looked. On Thursday, July 20, 1950, the crew of a north-bound freight train reported that two of the switch-lamp lenees at the south siding-switch were broken, and that the target was bent to indicate that the switch was lined for entry to the siding. However at this time, the switch was properly lined for movement on the main track and securely locked in that position. After the accident occurred, a boy, about 13 years of age, was taken into custody by the authorities on suspicion that he had tampered with the switch. He confessed that he had tampered with the switch on July 20, and that on the afternoon of July 22 he had obtained a hack saw, sawed the shackle of the switch lock, lined the switch for entry to the siding, broke the lenses of the switch lamp, and bent the target so that it indicated that the switch was lined for movement on the main track.

    Cause

    It is found that this accident was caused by malicious tampering with a switch.

    Dated at Washington, D. C., this thirty-first day of August, 1950.

    By the Commission, Commissioner Patterson.

    W. P. BARTEL,

    (SEAL)
    Secretary.

    FOOT NOTE

    1 Under authority of section 17 (2) of the Interstate Commerce Act the above-entitled proceeding was referred by the Commission to Commissioner Patterson for consideration and disposition.

    3341​



    INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION​



    WASHINGTON​



    REPORT NO. 3341​



    ST. LOUIS-SAN FRANCISCO RAILWAY COMPANY IN RE ACCIDENT AT HOLLAND MO., ON JULY 23, 1950​



    Report No. 3341​



    SUMMARY​


    Date: July 23, 1950

    Railroad: St. Louis-San Francisco

    Location: Holland, Mo.

    Kind of accident: Derailment

    Train involved: Passenger

    Train number: 806

    Engine number: 1067

    Consist: 7 cars

    Speed: 57 m. p. h.

    Operation: Timetable and train orders

    Track: Single; tangent; level

    Weather: Cloudy

    Time: 1:09 a.m.

    Casual ties: 1 killed; 22 injured

    Cause: Malicious tempering with switch
     
  10. frisco1522

    frisco1522 Staff Member Staff Member

    Hope the little jerk is still locked up.
     
  11. meteor910

    meteor910 2009 Engineer of the Year Staff Member Frisco.org Supporter

    I'm still curious - given that the 1060-1069 4-6-2's were lackluster performers at best, did the Springfield shops do their thing yet another time and turn the 1060-1069 4-6-4's into real winners?

    Ken
     
  12. TAG1014

    TAG1014 Frisco.org Supporter Frisco.org Supporter

    I've heard (Don't remenber where??) that the 1060's were almost the equals of the 1500's and drew many of the same asignments. Collias mentions that the first batch of the 1060's replaced 1500's on the Kansas City-Florida Special that were needed elsewhere.

    Tom
     
    Last edited by a moderator: Nov 21, 2010

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