TROOP TRAINS QUESTION!!

Discussion in 'Heavyweight Cars' started by FRISCO4503, Jan 17, 2014.

  1. FRISCO4503

    FRISCO4503 FRISCO4503 Frisco.org Supporter

    I have searched the site and had no luck, Did the FRISCO have troop trains and does anyone have a picture of one? I want to model a couple troop trains since I am Modeling 1945.
     
  2. Frisco1515

    Frisco1515 Frisco1515

    Sure, the Frisco had a lot of them. I have no pix of them, but I do have lots of memories of them. As a youngster during WWII I spent a lot of time at the Ft. Scott depot watching trains of all types. The railroads were hard pressed to supply enough motive power to supply the needs of the great number of trains that were so essential to the war effort. Older engines that had been in storage during the Great Depression were brought back into service to help fill the need. The troop trains were composed of chair cars, tourist pullmans, and often one of the wartime kitchen cars the Army provided. Trains could vary in length, some as short as 8 coaches with others being 15 to 20 or more. It's very likely that some of member have pictures of these trains, and you surely can find pictures on the internet. The Frisco often had to use freight engines on the troop trains.
     
  3. Oldguy

    Oldguy Member Frisco.org Supporter

  4. Karl

    Karl 2008 Engineer of the Year Frisco.org Supporter

    The ICC Historical Records contain two reports of accidents that occurred with troop trains as they traveled on the Frisco. The first is a report about a WWI-era, head-on collision that occurred in Marshfield, MO, and the second is a report about a Korean War era, sun-kink caused derailment that occurred near Menfro, MO. The reports provide us with the train consists and a bit about how the trains were operated. In both cases, the trains were powered by freight locomotives, and each had a caboose. In the first case, the train was operated as a PSGR Extra, and in the latter case, the train was operated as the second section of a freight train.
    It is sad to note that during the accidents casualties and fatalities occurred.
    INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION.
    REPORT OF THE CHIEF OF THE BUREAU OF SAFETY, COVERING THE INVESTIGATION OF AN ACCIDENT WHICH OCCURRED ON THE ST. LOUIS-SAN FRANCISCO RAILROAD NEAR MARSHFIELD, MO., ON SEPTEMBER 17, 1918.
    November 27, 1918.
    To the Commission:
    On September 17,1918, there was a head-end collision between a passenger train and a freight train on the St. Louis-San Francisco Railroad near Marshfield, Mo., which resulted in the death of 12 passengers and 3 employees, and the injury of 35 passengers and 5 employees. After investigation the following report is submitted:
    The Lebanon subdivision of the eastern division of the St. Louis-San Francisco Railroad, upon which this accident occurred, extends between Newberg and Springfield, Mo., a distance of 120 miles. It is a single-track line over which trains are operated by time-table, and train orders transmitted by telephone, supplemented by an automatic block signal system.
    The automatic signals are of the normal clear, three-position, upper quadrant type, the night indications being red, yellow, and green to indicate stop, caution, and proceed, respectively. The scheme of signal location provides for inbound and outbound signals placed at the switch at each end of a passing siding. Between sidings and depending on the distance, there are one or two pairs of signals, each pair being "staggered " about 3,300 feet, which is the normal length of a track circuit section. Signals governing movements in the same direction are from a mile and a third to two miles apart Preliminary sections are provided in order that two trains may not pass under opposing signals simultaneously, and by this arrangement a signals is held at stop after a train leaves the block until it passes off of the track circuit beyond the first opposing signal. The signal operating mechanisms were installed in August, 1910, and are well maintained. Track circuits are direct current and the signals are controlled by line wires, a polarized relay being used to control the third position. Oil lights are used. All switches are equipped with switch boxes, which shunt the track circuit, but the control wires are not broken through these switch boxes. Pipe connected train order boards, one for each direction, are located in front of the train order offices, these signals being two-position, lower quadrant semaphores with a circuit breaker box, clamped to the up-and-down rod, controlling the caution position of the automatic signal in the rear, so that when the order board is in the horizontal position the automatic signal indicates caution, provided the track circuit between that signal and the signal in advance is clear.
    The trains involved in this accident were eastbound passenger extra 1260, a troop train, and westbound freight second No. 39.
    Extra 1260 was on route from Waco, Tex., to St. Louis, Mo., and ,consisted of locomotive 1260 six Pullman sleeping cars, one baggage car, six Pullman sleeping cars, and a caboose, in the order named, all of wooden construction, except the second sleeping car from the engine, which had a steel underframe. This train was in charge of Conductor Wrinkle and Engineman Douglas and left Springfield, Mo., at 6.55 p.m., after the crew had received schedule train order No. 115, fixing a, schedule for that train from Springfield to Newberg, giving it right over all except first-class trains from Springfield to Newberg, and also providing that extra 1260 should not exceed a speed of 30 miles an hour. At Strafford, 11.4 miles east of Springfield, the crew received a copy of train order No. 123 stating that extra 1260 would run 15 minutes late. Extra 1260 passed Marshfield, 25.8 miles east of Springfield, at 7.43 p. m., and received train order No. 127 while passing there, which read as follows:
    "No. 9, engine 1069, meet passenger extra 1260 east at Conway."
    Extra 1260 passed automatic signal No. 2126, located 3,700 feet east of the depot. at Marshfield, which was in the stop position, and collided head-on with second No. 39 at a point about 3,860 feet east of automatic signal 2126, or 1.43 miles east of Marshfield and 13.5 miles west of Conway, at 7.45 p. m., while running at a speed estimated to have been about 30 miles an hour.
    Second No. 39 consisted of locomotive 56, four loaded and 60 empty cars, and was in charge of Conductor West and Engineman Beiseigle. It left Newberg at 10.45 a. m., and upon arrival at Lebanon, 62.7 miles west of Newberg, the crew received train order No. 113, reading as follows:
    " Second 39, Engine 56, has right over No. 32 to Marshfield and hold main line."
    This train left Lebanon at 6 p. m., passed Conway, 16.6 miles west of Lebanon and the last open train order office before reaching the point of accident, at 7.14 p. m., passed automatic signal No. 2103, located about 3 miles east of Marshfield, while that signal was in the caution position and collided with extra 1260 about 8,050 feet west of that signal while running at a speed of 12 or 15 miles an hour.
    The regular fireman, the student fireman, and head brakeman of extra 1260 were killed, and Engineman Douglas of that train was seriously injured. The front ends of both locomotives were badly damaged, their cylinders broken, and the engine trucks demolished. The tender on locomotive 1260 was derailed, turned around, and stood upright; the wooden sleeping car immediately behind it and ahead of the steel underframe sleeping car was demolished, nearly all of the killed and injured soldiers being in that car; the steel underframe sleeping car had its front end badly damaged, but it was not derailed; the third, fourth, fifth, and sixth cars remained on the track, and were undamaged, while the baggage, or seventh car, was demolished and the sleeping car immediately behind it was damaged considerably on its front end. The other cars of extra 1260 were not damaged. The tender of second No. 39 was derailed and stood up right and partially on top of a box car on the south side of the track. Three of the cars on the head end of second 39 were derailed and practically demolished, but the remainder of the train sustained only slight damage.
    FIG. 1
    FIG. 1. - Looking toward Marshfield from the west, showing automatic signals 2134 and 2135 and the train - order signal. Signals 2134 and 2135 are located 434 feet west of the train - order signal.
    FIG. 2
    FIG. 2. - Showing automatic signal 2126, to the right, about 1, 500 feet distant. This shows the first clear view of that signal after leaving the station at Marshfield. This signal located 3, 700 feet east of the train - order signal.
    Approaching the point of accident from the west, beginning at Marshfield, the track is straight for a distance of 1,590 feet, followed by a 2-degree curve to the right 1,060 feet long, then a tangent 3,645 feet long, then a 2-degree curve to the left 3,028 feet long, the accident occurring 1,270 feet from the west end of this curve. Beginning at a point about 3,650 feet west of the scene of accident, there is a descending grade varying from 0.2 to 1 per cent for a distance of 2,400 feet; then the grade is level for 500 feet,, and then there is an as ending grade varying from 0.6 to 0.95 per cent for a distance of 750 feet to the point of accident. Approaching the point of accident from the east and beginning at automatic signal No. 2103, the track is straight for a distance of about 3,000 feet, then there is an 18-minute 22-second curve to the right about 2,900 feet in length, then about 400 feet of tangent, which leads to the curve upon which the accident occurred. There is an ascending grade varying from 0.7 to 0.92 per cent for westbound trains for over a mile, and then the grade descends at the rate of 0.95 per cent for about 1,700 feet to the point of accident. The engineman of second No. 39 had a clear view ahead for a distance varying from 500 to 800 feet until within about 1,000 feet of the point of collision, when the view extended to 1,450 feet. The view of the engineman on extra 1260 was limited to about 900 feet. At the time of the accident the weather was clear
    Conductor Wrinkle of extra 1260 stated that he received train order 115 before leaving Springfield, and delivered a copy of it to Engineman Douglas, who read it back to him. His train left there at 6.55 p.m., in., approached Marshfield at a speed of 25 or 30 miles an hour, and passed through there at a speed of about 20 miles an hour. He said he did not see the train-order board at Marshfield but asked Brakeman Carner about it and he said it was red; neither did he notice the. position of the automatic signals west or east of Marshfield when his train passed them. He was in the rear car taking up transportation and did not notice the speed of the train after leaving Marshfield and had no intimation of the accident until the air brakes were applied in emergency, followed by the collision within a few seconds. Immediately after the collision he went to the front end of the train and saw Conductor Beiseigle of second 39 who said he had no orders concerning extra 1260. He saw automatic signals 2126 and 2127 a short time after the accident and in his opinion they were operating properly: the weather conditions were not such as to prevent the engineman seeing them.
    Rear Brakeman Carner of extra 1260 stated that as his train approached Marshfield he was riding on the rear platform of the caboose, Conductor Wrinkle asked him about the train order board, and upon looking at it he saw it was set at danger; at the time of the accident he was riding in the cupola of the caboose; he thought the speed of his train when it passed the east switch at Marshfield was 25 miles an hour and at the time of the collision it was 12 or 15 miles an hour. He said he rode in the cupola of the caboose nearly all the way from Springfield to the point of accident, saw most of the automatic signals, saw the automatic signal west of Marshfield in the caution position, but did not notice automatic signal 2126 east of Marshfield.
    Engineman Douglas of extra 1260 stated that the speed of his train was approximately 30 miles an hour after leaving Springfield, that he reduced speed to about 20 miles an hour while passing through Marshfield, increased the speed to about 30 miles an hour and was proceeding at that speed when he, applied the air brakes in emergency just before the collision occurred. He said that as he approached Marshfield the signal west of there was in the caution position, and upon looking at the train-order signal he saw it was set at danger. After receiving the order he looked at signal 2126, located about 3,700 feet east of that point, and it was in the clear position, but he did not notice it after that. He had no difficulty in seeing the signal; he stated he saw the blade and it was in. the clear position, but he does not remember whether the signal light was burning. He. was sure he saw the signal governing eastbound movements and did not confuse it with the signal governing westbound movements. Engineman Douglas stated that between the time he received the train order at Marshfield and passed signal 2126 he read the order, gave it to the brakeman, looked at the lubricator, read his schedule and running orders, turned on the headlight, and hooked up the engine.
    Conductor West, of second No. 39, stated that his train arrived at Lebanon at 5.25 p.m., and after finishing the work there he called for and received the necessary orders and left there at 6 p.m., arriving at Phillipsburg at 6.30 p.m. He said he held an order giving extra 1066 rights over all trains; as that train was due at Phillipsburg at 6.38 p. m., he called the dispatcher and asked him about it; he was told it would be 17 or 18 minutes late, and he waited until that train arrived, leaving there at 7 p.m. He said he received a copy of train order 113 at Lebanon. He was riding in the cupola of the caboose of his train and the speed was about 20 miles an hour when it approached: signal 2103. He saw signal 2103 when about 80 car lengths away and it was then at caution, and when the engine and seven or eight cars had passed it, it changed to stop. He was riding in the cupola of the caboose on the side next to the station when his train passed Conway, about 7.15 p.m. He said the train order board there was clear the station was lighted up, but he did not see the operator or anyone else there.
    Engineman Beiseigle of second No. 39 stated he received train order No. 113 at Lebanon; his train met extra 1066 at Phillipsburg, 12.1 miles west of Lebanon, and its speed was 25 or 30 miles an hour when it reached signal 2103, which was in the caution position. The fireman remarked that No. 32 was over at Marshfield heading in; he was of the same opinion and did not shut off steam when he saw the signal in the caution position, although being on an ascending grade the speed of the train was reduced considerably before the collision occurred. The first intimation he had of the approach of extra 1260 was the reflection of its headlight on the rails, and that train came within view almost immediately about 300 or 400 feet away. He shut off steam, applied the air brakes in emergency, and he and the two firemen jumped off, there being about 10 seconds between the time he applied the brakes and the occurrence of the collision. He said he had received no orders concerning extra 1260 and knew nothing about that train until he saw it approaching. He stated that the operating rules require trains to be run under control after passing a caution signal, and said the speed of his train was such that he could have stopped it within his range of vision, but could not state.. how fast his train was running at the time of the collision.
    Fireman Wilfong of second No. 39 stated that when his train reached signal 2103 it was in the caution position, the engineman partially abut off steam, and his train passed it at a speed of about 18 miles an hour. When the train had passed the signal about a half train length the engineman made a light application of the air brakes. Train was drifting at a speed of about 12 miles an hour. when he saw smoke ahead; he did not think it was an approaching train, but thought it was train 32 at Marshfield.
    Fireman Mack of second No. 39 stated that when he saw signal 2103 in the caution position he thought it was in that position because train 32 was heading in on the passing track at Marshfield. He said the engineman shut off steam and made a light application of the air brakes after passing the signal, and thought the speed of his train was about 10 miles an hour when the air brakes were applied in emergency.
    Rear Brakeman Sater of second 39 stated that he was riding in the cupola of the caboose on the left-hand side of the train, and noticed the train-order boards at Phillipsburg, Conway, and Niangua were in the clear position. He thought the speed of his train was about 20 miles an hour until it reached signal 2103, when the engineman applied the air brakes and reduced the speed to about 12 miles an hour, but thought the speed had been reduced to about 5 miles an hour when the collision occurred: He said they had received no orders concerning extra 1260.
    Dispatcher Chronister, on duty at Springfield, stated that he assumed his present duties on August 23, 1918, after having had several years' experience on other roads; he came on duty at about 4 p.m. on the day of the accident, and shortly thereafter he was advised that extra 1260 was on the road and would arrive at Springfield at about 6.20 p. m. He then began to make arrangements to move that train against all opposing trains, and prepared train order No. 115; he commenced telephoning it to the stations concerned about 6 or 6.02 p.m., and, as the order was quite long, it had to be transmitted slowly. He said the order was delivered to extra 1260 at Springfield and completed at 6.42 p. m., and it was transmitted to Conway for-second No. 39, repeated and made complete from that office at 6.08 p. m. He could not say what person repeated the order from Conway, except that it was the second-trick operator there. He stated that he did not intend to let extra 1260 pass Conway before the arrival of second No. 39, but did not instruct the operator there to place the train-order board against extra 1260 or issue any order to hold that train there; neither had he taken steps to hold second No. 39 at Conway other than by order No. 115. He admitted that if second No. 39 had been delayed between Lebanon and Conway until after the time shown on the schedule for extra 1260 and the means of communication with Conway had failed, there would have been nothing to prevent a collision between the two trains east of Conway. He said that he called first upon those offices to repeat the order where he wanted trains to move first so as not to delay those movements, and would have the operators repeat only that part of the order that was essential for that particular office. Dispatcher Chronister stated that he was not familiar with the code of dispatching as prescribed by the Frisco rules, but was. familiar with the general practice as prescribed by the standard rules. He stated that the Frisco book of rules had not been delivered to him, but he had seen the book and looked up the form of train orders shown in it. Since the accident a bulletin had come to his knowledge which made it imperative that the record of train numbers and train-order numbers be repeated by operators from clearances, and the personal sign of the operators be made a record in the train dispatcher's book. He said he endeavoured, as a matter of self-protection, to cheek the clearances of all trains, but did not get the operator's sign in all cases, as they did not all give it.
    FIG. 3
    FIG. 3. - The second car in extra 1260 after the accident. This was a wooden tourist car in which most of the killed and injured were riding.
    FIG. 4
    Fig. 4. - Looking from the west toward the curve upon which the accident occurred.
    FIG. 5
    FIG. 5. - A part of the wreckage and the timber that obscured the enginemen's visions across the curve.
    FIG. 6
    FIG. 6. - Locomotive 1260 after the collision.
    FIG. 7
    FIG. 7. - Locomotive 56 after the collision.
    Operator Foster stated that he was on duty at Conway from 3 to 11 p.m. on the day of the accident, and was absent from the office from 5.40 or 5.45 p.m. until 6.15, or 6.20 p.m., having been excused by the dispatcher for the purpose of going home to supper, and the depot office was locked while he was gone. He said he had no undelivered-train orders in the office when he left it to go to supper and the train-order signal was in the clear position. He said he was in the office when second No. 39 passed Conway at 7.14 p.m., and he immediately reported that train to the dispatcher, asked about train No. 9 and was told that it was late. He said he had no other conversation with the dispatcher before the collision and received only one train order while working his trick and that was completed at 9.06 p.m. When told that the dispatcher's record showed that train order No. 115 was transmitted to Conway and completed at 6.08 p.m. he stated that he was not in the office at that time and positively denied that he had ever received that order. He made an affidavit to that effect. Later the dispatcher informed him of the wreck and asked him if he had given second No. 39 order 115 and he replied that he never received that order, and the dispatcher replied that the order was completed as to Conway at 6.08 p.m. and there was no further conversation between them concerning it.
    H. G. Herston, an insurance agent, stated that, he was in Conway on the day of the accident, met Operator Foster on his way back to the station and walked back with him, arriving there probably about 6.30 p.m. Upon arrival at the station he went inside with him and talked to him for some little time concerning a; ticket.
    Operator Windle, on duty at the north side freight terminal yards, Springfield, stated that the dispatcher called him to take order 115, heard the dispatcher call Conway, and the order was delayed waiting for that station to answer. He thought someone answered and the dispatcher gave the order to all the operators concerned and he heard several repeat it, but could not say whether Conway repeated it, bat thought he did.
    Operator Henron, at Dixon, stated that he heard the dispatcher trying to call the operator at Conway preparatory to transmitting order 115, but could not say whether he received any response.
    Operator Robertson, at Lebanon, stated that he received train order 115, heard several of the offices repeat the order, but could not say whether Conway received or repeated it. When he received the order second 39 was out in the yards, having previously been cleared. After the accident he heard the dispatcher call Conway, ask the operator what he did with train order 115 and heard the operator reply that he never had it.
    Operator Hathaway stated that he was on duty at Richland from 3 to 11 p.m. and did not receive a copy of train order No. 115.
    Charles E. Williams foreman of the wrecking crew, stated that he overhead some of the soldiers remark that they had been riding in the second coach of extra 1260, and they said the signal at the passing track switch east of Marshfield was red before the engine of that train reached it. He was unable to ascertain the names of the soldiers who claimed to have seen the signal.
    F. E. Richardson, in charge of the pump house, stated that he resided about 700 feet west of the east Switch at Marshfield and was home when extra 1260 passed. He said he looked at automatic signal 2126 when the engine and one car had passed it and it showed red. He had not noticed the signal prior to this.
    R. D. Dailey made an affidavit to the effect that on the day of the accident he was standing a short distance west of signal 2126 at Marshfield about 7.45 p.m. and saw extra 1260 approaching that signal. Upon looking at the signal he saw that the signal blade was in the horizontal or stop position and the light on the signal showed red. He thought the train would back in on the siding when it ran past the signal, but it continued on its way and had gone about 100 yards when he heard the crash.
    The direct cause of this accident was the failure of Dispatcher Chronister to transmit train order 115 to the operator at Conway for delivery to train second No. 39, and the failure of Engineman Douglas to observe and obey the stop indications of automatic signal 2126.
    Dispatcher Chronister claims that he transmitted train order 115 to the operator at Conway and received a complete on it at 6.08 p.m., while Operator Foster, on duty at Conway, is equally positive that he did not receive that order. The statement of Operator Foster that he had been excused by the dispatcher for the purpose of going to supper and was absent from the office from 5.40 or 5.45 p.m. until 6.15 or 6.20 p.m., and the statement, of Mr. Herston that he walked back to the station with Mr. Foster, arriving there sometime near 6.30 p.m., would indicate that Operator Foster was not in the office at Conway at the time Dispatcher Chronister claims he transmitted he order to him. In view of this evidence, it is believed that Dispatcher Chronister failed to transmit that order to the operator at Conway, and to that extent he is responsible for this accident.
    The distance between automatic signals 2126 and 2103 is 11,910 feet, and extra 1260 ran a distance of 3,860 feet past signal 2126, while second No. .39 ran a distance of 8,050 feet past signal 2103 before the collision occurred. A westbound train sets signal 2126 in the stop position when 15,586 feet, or nearly 3 miles east of that signal; and second No. 39 ran a distance of 11,359 feet, or a little more than 2 miles, under that protection, before colliding with extra 1260. Signal 2134 is located about 434 feet west of the station at Marshfield, or about 4,000 feet west of signal 2126, and the evidence indicates that this signal was in the caution position when extra 1260 passed it, and the train-order signal at Marshfield was in the stop position, which, of itself, would cause signal 2134 to assume the caution position; this indication would also be caused by a train in hat track section immediately east of signal 2103, at which time signal 2110, located 8,986 feet east of signal 2126, and signal 2126 should have been in the stop position. A very careful examination as made of signals 2126 and 2103 and nothing was found to indicate that they were not working properly at the time of the accident. Notwithstanding the statement of Engineman Douglas that signal 2126 was in the clear position when extra 1260 passed it, in *** of the statements of Mr. Richardson and Mr. Dailey, as well as the fact that nothing was found to be wrong with the signal mechanism, it is believed that signal 2126 was in the stop position when extra 1260 passed it.
    This accident is another example of that class of accidents which could be prevented by the use of an automatic train-control device. As has been frequently pointed out in previous reports of this bureau, such devices are available for use. Until they are adopted and used by railroads for the purpose intended, accidents, caused by the failure of engineman to obey signal indications, may be expected to occur.
    All of the employees involved were experienced men with good records. Dispatcher Chronister was employed by the St. Louis & San Francisco Railroad on August 23, 1918, but he claims to have had several years' experience as an operator on other roads. Engineman Douglas was employed as a fireman in 1905, and promoted to engineman on February 12, 1918. Dispatcher Chronister had been on duty 3 hours and 45 minutes; Operator Foster, 4 hours and 45 minutes; the crew of extra 1260, 2 hours and 15 minutes; and second No. 39, 11 hours and 5 minutes.
    Respectfully submitted.
    W. P. BORLAND,
    Chief, Bureau of Safety.
    WASHINGTON: GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1919
    DIAGRAM
    FIG 8.-Plan and Profile of track in vicinity of accident.





    INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION
    WASHINGTON
    REPORT NO. 3529
    ST. LOUIS-SAN FRANCISCO RAILWAY COMPANY
    IN RE ACCIDENT NEAR MENFRO, MO., ON JULY 25, 1953
    Report No. 3529
    SUMMARY
    Date: July 25, 1953
    Railroad: St. Louis-San Francisco
    Location: Menfro, Mo.
    Kind of accident: Derailment
    Train Involved: Passenger
    Train number: Second 836
    Engine number: Diesel-electric units 603, 604, and 607
    Consist: 22 cars, caboose
    Speed: 55 m. p. h.
    Operation: Timetable, train orders, and automatic block-signal system
    Track: Signal; 5 degree 12' curve; 0.2 percent descending grade northward
    Weather: Clear
    Time: 12:20 p.m.
    Casualties: 1 killed; 38 injured
    Cause: Kinked track
    IN THE MATTER OF MAKING ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORTS UNDER THE ACCIDENT REPORTS ACT OF MAY 6, 1910.
    ST. LOUIS-SAN FRANCISCO RAILWAY COMPANY
    August 31, 1953
    Accident near Menfro, Mo., on July 25, 1953, caused by kinked track.
    REPORT OF THE COMMISSION 1
    CLARKE, Commissioner:
    On July 25, 1953, there was a derailment of a passenger train on the St. Louis-San Francisco Railway near Menfro, Mo., which resulted in the death of 1 passenger, and the injury of 36 passengers, 1 passenger representative, and 1 train-service employee.
    Diagram
    Report No. 3529 St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Near Menfro, No. July 25, 1953
    Location of Accident and Method of Operation
    This accident occurred on that part of the River-Division extending between Chaffee and St. Louis, Mo., 143.6 miles. In the vicinity of the point of accident this is a single-track line, over which trains are operated by timetable, train orders, and an automatic block-signal system. The accident occurred on the main track at a point 52 miles north of Chaffee and 3.4 miles south of the station at Menfro. From the south there are, in succession, a tangent 1,004 feet in length, a 2 degree 10' curve to the left 1,374 feet, a tangent 385 feet, and a 5 degree 12' curve to the right 553 feet to the point of accident and 409 feet northward. The grade for north-bound trains is 0.2 percent descending a distance of 386 feet to the point of accident and 392 feet northward. The accident occurred in a hillside cut.
    On the curve on which the accident occurred the track structure consists of 90-pound rail, 33 feet in length, laid on an average of 20 treated ties to the rail length. It is fully tieplated with single-shoulder canted tieplates, single-spiked, and is provided with 4-hole 24-inch joint bars and an average of 8 rail anchors per rail. It is ballasted with chatts to a depth of about 10 inches below the bottoms of the ties. At the point of accident the specified superelevation was 6 inches.
    Automatic signal 934, governing north-bound movements on the main track, is located 1.69 miles south of the point of accident.
    The maximum authorized speed for passenger trains is 60 miles per hour, but it is restricted to 50 miles per hour on the curve on which the accident occurred.
    Description of Accident
    Second 836, a north-bound second-class passenger train, consisted of Diesel-electric units 603, 604, and 607, coupled in multiple-unit control, two baggage cars, five sleeping cars, one kitchen car, nine sleeping cars, one kitchen car, four sleeping cars, and a caboose, in the order named. The eighth car, the eighteenth car, and the caboose were of steel underframe construction. The other cars were of conventional all-steel construction. This train departed from Chaffee, the last open office, at 10:40 a.m., 8 hours late, passed signal 934, which indicated Proceed, and while moving at a speed of 55 miles per hour, as indicated by the tape of the speed recording device, the first car, the front truck of the second car, and the fourth to the twelfth cars, inclusive, were derailed.
    Separations occurred at each end of the seventh, eighth, and ninth cars. The front portion of the train stopped with the front end 1,100 feet north of the point of accident. The first car and the front-truck of the second car derailed to the east and stopped in line with the track. The fourth to the sixth cars, inclusive, derailed to the west and stopped approximately in line with the track. The fourth car leaned toward the west at an angle of about 60 degrees. The seventh car stopped with the front end 354 feet north of the point of accident. The front and the rear ends of this car were, respectively, 15 feet and 33 feet west of the track. It leaned toward the west at an angle of about 45 degrees. The eighth car stopped upright and approximately at right angles to the track, with the left side of the car against the rear end of the seventh car. The ninth car stopped upright, across the track and in line with the eighth car. The tenth, eleventh, and twelfth cars stopped upright and in line, with the front end of the tenth car against the right side of the eighth car and the rear truck of the twelfth car on the track structure. The fourth to the sixth cars, inclusive, and the twelfth car were considerably damaged. The seventh to the ninth cars, inclusive, were badly damaged. Escaping gasoline in the eighth car, the kitchen car, became ignited, and the seventh, eighth, and ninth cars were further damaged by fire. The thirteenth car was slightly damaged.
    The conductor was injured.
    The temperature as recorded at Ste. Genevieve, Mo., 23.2 miles north of Menfro, was 96 degrees at noon on the day the accident occurred. The weather was clear at the time of the accident, which occurred at 12:20 p.m.
    Discussion
    As Second 836 was approaching the point where the accident occurred the speed was 55 miles per hour. The enginemen, the front brakeman, and a road foreman of equipment were maintaining a lookout ahead from the control compartment of the first Diesel-electric unit. The conductor and the flagman were in the caboose. The employees in the control compartment of the first Diesel-electric unit said that the unit was riding smoothly and that there was no indication of defective track until immediately before the accident occurred. At that time the Diesel-electric unit lurched from side to side, and several seconds later the brakes became applied in emergency as a result of the derailment. These employees did not observe any irregularities in the alinement of the track in front of the train. The engineer thought the excessive lateral movement of the locomotive was caused by kinked track.
    After the accident, a section of track about 30 feet in length on the 5 degree 12' curve to the right was found to be deflected outward or to the left. The maximum deflection, which was about 8 inches, was located near the north end of the deflected portion of track. The west rail was canted outward throughout most of the deflected section. A broken rail was found on the east side of the track at the northward end of the deflected section. The break was new and there were no batter marks. The fractured surfaces indicated that the rail was broken by lateral stresses exerted against the gage side of the rail. North of the broken rail, the track was destroyed throughout a distance of approximately 275 feet. The first marks of derailment appeared on the track structure immediately north of the point where the broken rail was found.
    Prior to the occurrence of this accident there had been no unusual displacement of the track structure in the vicinity of the point of accident. The section foreman last inspected the track in this vicinity the day before the accident occurred. A south-bound passenger train passed the point at which the accident occurred 1 hour 15 minutes prior to the time of the accident. The crew of that train said that there was no indication of defective track. An official of the railroad who examined the track structure soon after the derailment occurred was of the opinion that the track kinked as a result of high temperature.
    From the unusual movement of the first Diesel-electric unit, the manner in which the equipment became derailed, the high temperature in the hillside cut, and the condition of the track structure after the derailment occurred, it is evident that the rails were compressed at the time of the accident and that the additional force resulting from the movement of Second 836 was sufficient to cause the track to be suddenly deflected outward as Second 836 was passing over it.
    Cause
    It Is found that this accident was caused by kinked track.
    Dated at Washington, D. C., this thirty-first day of August, 1953.
    By the Commission, Commissioner Clarke.
    (SEAL) GEORGE W. LAIRD,
    Acting Secretary.
    FOOTNOTE:
    1 Under authority of section 17 (2) of the Interstate Commerce Act the above-entitled proceeding was referred by the Commission to Commissioner Clarke for consideration and disposition.
     
  5. kenmc

    kenmc KenMc Frisco.org Supporter

    A photo of this accident, showing a Southern Ry Pullman at right angle to the track with the next Pullman impacted, was in the Southeast Missourian newspaper the next day. I have the clipping at home and perhaps can scan it, but maybe Keith or Tim could find it on line as well. It was a National Guard troop train.

    Ken McElreath

    Here is the clipping from the Southeast Missourian.
     

    Attached Files:

    Last edited by a moderator: Feb 12, 2014
  6. tomd6

    tomd6 Passed Away February 11, 2018

    I would imagine the Central Division saw troop trains as Camp (later Fort Chafee)was located east of Fort Smith on the MOP's Paris branch and Camp Maxey, TX. Chaffee had 40,000 inhabitants including German POW's while Maxey had 45,000 including POW's.
     
  7. One of the earliest memories I have is when my dad took me down to the depot and we stood on the loading platform of the Frisco Freight depot at Fort Scott and watched the area National Guard board a troop train for the Korean War. I was about 4, but I still remember it, like it was yesterday.
     
  8. gbnf

    gbnf Member

    You could do a "selective compression" simulation by using six heavyweight Pullmans with a baggage car in the middle of the train to simulate the troop kitchen. The men ate in their seats. Not a lot of baggage. You might add a couple of 40 ft. flats at the head end for vehicles. 4-8-2 steam locomotive.

    Discussion of Ft. Leonard Wood with links to other frisco.org threads
    http://www.frisco.org/shipit/index.php?threads/ft-leonard-wood-line.1454/

    First hand account
    http://www.trailblazersww2.org/history_troopmovements_accounts_higley.htm

    America was still coming out of the Depression, and the war department commandeered any and all equipment, regardless of age or condition, running troop trains at night for security.

    Here are ideas for a more elaborate consist:
    http://www.trainweb.org/fredatsf/troop1.htm and http://www.trainweb.org/fredatsf/troop2.htm

    Good discussion of prototype (general, not Frisco specific)
    http://cs.trains.com/mrr/f/13/t/9346.aspx

    "Troop Train" 1943 movie by the War Dept.
     

    Attached Files:

    Last edited by a moderator: Apr 8, 2016
  9. TAG1014

    TAG1014 Frisco.org Supporter Frisco.org Supporter

    Not the 1945 era, but somewhere (??) on this chatboard is a Mike Condren photo (OR could be on Mike's own website??) of a diesel era troop train in Arkansas, ca. 1962. A couple ALco FA's sandwiching two GP-7's pulling with one of the Frisco b/y steam generator cars behind the engines. I'd post the photo myself, but I gave it up long ago trying to post any pictures here.

    TAG1014
     
  10. Frisco1515

    Frisco1515 Frisco1515

    I'm quite sure that the Frisco took troop trains to and from Ft. Sill in Oklahoma, and probably Ft. Leonard Wood in Misssouri as well. Troop trains were handed off to other roads too as the destinations required.
     
  11. frisco1522

    frisco1522 Staff Member Staff Member

    I tried to post some pictures last night, but for some reason they wouldn't upload. Always had worked before. ????
     
  12. gstout

    gstout Member Frisco.org Supporter

  13. jmlaboda

    jmlaboda Member

    Below are summaries of two MAIN consists that were involved with derailments or collisions in 1944, the first on the L&N and the second on the Rock Island...

    L&N Train #47, July 6th, 1944

    L&N 418 4-8-2
    Pullman tourist car *
    Pullman tourist car *
    Pullman tourist car *
    Pullman tourist car *
    Pullman troop kitchen
    Pullman troop sleeper
    Pullman tourist car *
    Pullman tourist car *
    HW baggage
    Pullman troop sleeper
    Pullman troop sleeper
    Pullman troop sleeper
    Pullman troop kitchen
    Pullman troop sleeper
    Pullman troop sleeper
    HW baggage

    (One or both of the baggage cars may have been set up as a make-shift kitchen car but it is likely that the baggage car on the end was carrying supplies and gear for the soldiers on board.)

    CRIP collison -- 3 Sept 1944

    CRIP 5061 4-8-3(?)
    express - boxcar
    wood baggage (SUF - steel underfame)
    Pullman troop sleeper
    Pullman tourist car *
    Pullman tourist car *
    Pullman tourist car *
    wood troop kitchen (SUP)
    Pullman tourist car *
    Pullman sleeper
    Pullman tourist car *
    Pullman tourist car *
    wood caboose (SUF)

    * - It is worth noting that the majority of the cars that became Pullman Tourist cars lacked air-conditioning and the accompanying roof top air ducts. Only a small number of these cars retained the air duct that was applied when the car received AC, which was removed for Tourist Car service. For a truly accurate model this will need to be taken into consideration when choosing appropriate cars. Pullman car names for Pullman Plan 2585D and 2585E 10 Section - 1 Drawing Room - 2 Compartment, Plan 3410 and 3410A 12 Section - 1 Drawing Room and Plan 3585 and 3585A 10 Section - 1 Drawing Room - 2 Compartment cars can be found on the N-scale Varnish website, along with info such as the AC type (if any) the number of steps (3 or 4) and disposition. These listings can be found on the pages linked to below...

    http://n-scalevarnish.info/index/Varnish/Pullman_2585.htm
    http://n-scalevarnish.info/index/Varnish/Pullman_3410.htm
    http://n-scalevarnish.info/index/Varnish/Pullman_3585.htm
     

Share This Page